

Cuba file

23 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Crates at Guerra

1. As requested, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has met today to explore what reconnaissance activities might usefully be directed at the "riddle" of the extensive crates stored at Guerra, a location near which a cruise-missile site is under suspected development.

2. COMOR has made an investigation of previous coverage of Guerra which revealed as follows: A quick check shows that 44 crates were observed at Guerra on 17, 18, and 20 January. On 19 January, 60 crates were reported but inspection shows that the quality of the photography was poor and the 60 could be in error. Furthermore, the photo interpreter indicated without, however, a thorough immediate check that these crates have been there for some time. Guerra was photographed on 14 occasions between 1 January and 20 January. The immediate PI reports during this period indicated either no missile activity or no change, except for the first appearance of the crates in the IPIR of 19 January. It is important to note that 44 crates were already at Guerra on 17 January when the Simferopol docked. A quick scan of the reports on many targets throughout Cuba shows the presence of numerous crates. This has long been observed. In the light of the foregoing, COMOR does not consider the presence of these crates to be an unusual indication of some ominous activity.

3. COMOR has been advised by the National Photographic Interpretation Center technicians responsible for Cuban readout that the information available from [REDACTED] photography on the crates would not likely give us more information

25X1A

Copy 1-A

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP92B01090R002600090049-8

25X1A

about the contents than is obtainable from [REDACTED] unless the crates were open, and the contents discernible. In the light of this advice and taking account of the surrounding establishments, equipments, and general layout, COMOR does not believe that the use of [REDACTED] can be justified in terms of providing the critical information on what, in fact, is going on at Guerra. COMOR will continue to target Guerra for

25X1A

25X1D

so recommend.

25X1A

Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

CONCUR:

SIGNED
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Date 23 JAN 1963

Copy 1--DCI
2--DDCI
3--DDI
4--DDR
5--CIA Member, COMOR
6--ORR DDI
7--SA/DDR
8--SA/DDR

SECRET